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ABSTRACT: This paper unites Deely’s call for a better understanding of semiotics with Jaeger’s 
insight into the sophists and the cultural history of the Ancient Greeks. The two bodies of 
knowledge are brought together to try to better understand the importance of rhetorical 
processes to political forms such as democracy. Jaeger explains how cultural expression, 
particularly poetry, changed through the archaic and classical eras to deliver, or at least to be 
commensurate with contemporary politics and ideologies. He explains how Plato (429-347 
BCE) struggled against certain poetry and prose manifestations in his ambition to create a 
‘perfect man’ – a humanity which would think in a way which would enable the ideal Republic 
to flourish. Deely’s approach based on Poinsot and Peirce presents a theoretical framework by 
means of which we can think of the struggle to influence individual and communal 
conceptualisation as a struggle within semiotics. This is a struggle over the ways reality is 
signified by signs. Signs are physical and mental indications which, in the semiotic tradition, 
are taken to produce human subjectivity – human ‘being’. Deely’s extensive body of work is 
about how these signs are the building blocks of realist constructions of understanding. This 
paper is concerned with the deliberate use of oral and written signs in rhetorical activity which 
have been deliberately crafted to change subjectivity. We discuss: (1) what thought and culture 
is in terms of semiotics and (2) Jaeger’s depiction of Ancient Greece as an illustration of the 
conjunction between culture and subjectivity. These two fields are brought together in order to 
make the argument that rhetoric can be theorised as the deliberate harnessing of semiotic 
effects. The implication is that the same semiotic, subjectivity-changing potency holds for 21st 
century rhetoric. However fourth century BCE Athens is the best setting for a preliminary 
discussion of rhetoric as deliberate semiotic practice because this was when rhetoric was most 
clearly understood for what it is. By contrast a discussion concentrating on modern rhetoric: 
public relations; advertising; lobbying; and public affairs would open wider controversies 
requiring considerably more complex explanation.     
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SEMIOTIC THEORY 
John Deely’s major project is about how the philosophical approach called semiosis 
originated with the scholastics who called it doctrina signorum. He explains how this 
valuable work was eclipsed at the beginning of modernity. He goes on to herald and 
advocate the resurgence of semiosis as centrally important to the future of 
‘postmodern’ philosophy. In Descartes and Poinsot: The Crossroads of Signs and Ideas1, Deely 
explicates the semiotics of John Poinsot (1589-1644) and contrasts them with the 
philosophy of Poinsot’s celebrated contemporary Rene Descartes (1596-1650). 
Elsewhere2 Deely explains how two centuries later Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) 
replicated the semiotic realist theory of Poinsot without ever reading his forerunner. 
For Deely, both Poinsot and Descartes lived during a fulcrum in the history of ideas 
when nominalist thought triumphed. The scales came down heavily against realism 
and strongly in favour of solipsism3. Descartes’ idealist philosophy implied that 
knowledge of the world came only from what was ‘imagined’ in the mind. There was 
no way of ‘knowing’ the world directly in any real way except via a notion of God. 
Deely suggests many succeeding mainstream philosophers from Hume and Kant 
onwards have struggled to tie their schema back to the real world. The concept of 
God or ‘Supreme Being’ is sometimes resorted to as the only way of filling in the 
lacuna in these philosophies. Deely’s thoughts on the relevance of ‘God’ to philosophy 
are given later in this paper. Descartes’ God-dependent idealism was adopted as the 
foundation of modern philosophy despite the fact that while Descartes was alive 
Poinsot finished his rendition of a far superior realist philosophy which was not God 
dependent4
                                                     
1 John N. Deely, Descartes & Poinsot : the crossroad of signs and ideas, Scranton, Pa. ; London, University of 
Scranton Press, 2008. 
. Poinsot’s Tractatus de Signis was the culmination of more than a 
millennium of developments of thought stemming from professor of rhetoric: St 
Augustine of Hippo (345-430 CE). Poinsot’s and Peirce’s semiotics posits that thought, 
like all other behaviours of living things, can only happen in relation to the exterior 
and interior environment of that life form. Simple beings behave in a simple way in 
response to what they encounter in their environment. But even those highly complex 
2 John N. Deely, Four ages of understanding : the first postmodern survey of philosophy from ancient times to the turn of 
the twenty-first century, Toronto ; Buffalo, University of Toronto Press, 2001. 
3  from solus ipse – Latin for ‘he himself said it alone’ 
4 John Poinsot, Tractatus de Signis, 1632. (Subsequently rendered by John Deely, Tractatus de Signis, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985.) 
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manifestations of life: ‘people’ draw all, including their most abstract forms of 
thought, ultimately from aspects of how their actual, real world has at some stage 
been sensed and subsequently conceived and objectified. By ‘objectify’ Poinsot, Peirce 
and Deely mean the making of some sort of mental acquisition of an actual or 
conceptual entity. Fresh mental acquisitions lead to new mental orientations. But new 
mental orientations, that is the acquisition of potential for new thinking, means that 
we become different people. We become different people, however slightly, as our 
subjectivity – i.e. who we are – is able to choose different responses to things and 
concepts. We are different because we now have a different range of possible 
conceptualisations. For example if we have learned to fly a plane or if we have 
celebrated a birthday the acquisition of all the new habits, mental images and 
incidental thoughts involved in those endeavours enable us to exercise a slightly 
different totality of mental being. These changes to subjectivity happen as the myriad 
representations of the new experiences are received and integrated into the previous 
way we were – into our former subjectivity. This acquisition of new representations 
takes place via the ‘signs’ of semiotics. Signs of new external entities and new internal 
concepts interact with the representations of prior concepts and sensations which 
already comprise the existing structure of our thinking faculties. This ‘interaction’ is 
an ‘intellectual sense making’ process. In short it is conscious and unconscious 
‘thinking.’ In thinking about something, particularly when something new is 
encountered, an understandable ‘object’ – that is a multi-facetted relationship to 
previously acquired mental representations is produced in thought of what it is that 
the person is now encountering. This ‘object’ may be ‘like’ some other representations 
already held in thought because this new semiotic stimulus seems to conjure up those 
similar signs. Or perhaps the objectification is one involving internal signs which 
involve the representation of dislike, or perhaps of welcome. Here is another 
illustration: Your mind is constructing mental objects as you read this. Within the 
primordial limitations of your corporeal, sensate abilities you are seeing marks on a 
page and comparing what you can conceive of what they mean in terms of the vast 
repository of formal and informal cultural and educational concepts which are 
already stored in your mind – which already comprise you as a person. These prior 
concepts are held in a huge network of mental entities which represent some aspects 
of your past engagement with trying to make sense of your external and ‘internal’ – 
that is your conceptual – world. These are mental entities which have developed 
since, and perhaps before, you were born. They are entities via which you ‘make 
sense’, or try to make sense of everything you encounter. Both these prior existing as 
well as the new entities which you are encountering internally and externally by 
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reading this page are known to the semiotic tradition as ‘signs’. The new and the 
existing ‘signs’ interact as you relate what you are reading here to how you are 
already semiotically comprised. In this sense you ‘objectify’ … that is you make a 
form of internal and external intellectual acquisition and become slightly changed in 
the process. (For the better we hope!) The most abstract of this sort of sign-produced 
thought may involve cultural notions many times removed and quite alien to how the 
external world actual is. But however wrongly and strangely formed those 
abstractions may be, however jumbled within myriads of elements of cultural 
conceiving systems, according to doctrina signorum, our building blocks of ideas always 
ultimately arise from signs generated in connection with the real world via the 
objectification of things which are real: such as aeroplane flying; a birthday; or 
reading this page. These are all real, actual things which happen in the world, even 
including culturally inspired birthday celebrations! Consequently semiotic 
explanations overcome the solipsism manifest in Cartesian philosophy. This solipsism 
was early brought into stark focus by Bishop George Berkley (1685-1753)5. Berkeley’s 
solution to how we can none the less operate in a world which is only fabricated in the 
mind, is that we are all infused with the spirit of God who made both us and the 
world in the first place6
                                                     
5 “23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or 
books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in 
it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books 
and trees, and the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not 
you yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose; it only 
shews you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind: but it does not shew that you can 
conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make out this, it is 
necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. 
When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only 
contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does 
conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, though at the same time they are 
apprehended by or exist in itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth and evidence of what 
is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of material 
substance.” George Berkeley and Jonathan Dancy, A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge, 
Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press, 1998. 
. For Berkeley it is the workings of God’s spirit in our mind 
6 “29. But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by 
Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my 
power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present 
themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them 
are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them. (ibid.) 
“146. But, though there be some things which convince us human agents are concerned in producing 
them; yet it is evident to everyone that those things which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far 
greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or dependent on, the wills of 
men. There is therefore some other Spirit that causes them; since it is repugnant that they should subsist 
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which links us to the reality of the nature which ‘He’ made. Like Berkeley, Descartes7
I seem to discover a path that will lead us from the contemplation of the true 
God, in whom all the treasure of knowledge and wisdom are contained, to the 
knowledge of the other things in the universe. (Descartes and others, 1968, p. 
132)  
 
resorts to God to repair this problem of the lack of connection to the world:  
Any failure of this God-given ability to correctly perceive the world, apparently 
solipsistically in the mind only arises because: 
…my being mistaken arises from the fact that the power which God has given 
me of discerning the true from the false is not infinite in me. (ibid, p. 134)  
Deely elsewhere8
The forgoing has been an attempt to lay out the theoretical basis for the rest of 
this article. Semiotics is rather hard to summarise in a few pages. All that can be 
hoped is that there has been a sufficiently credible description of semiotics to make 
this theory applicable to what we might call the following ‘case study’ of ancient 
Greek conceptualisation. 
 suggests that what is referred to as ‘God’ should be left to 
theology and the realm of the mystics as not germane to any serious discussion of 
philosophy. Deely suggests that Poinsot and Peirce’s closely corresponding systems of 
semiotics are more credible explanations of how people can stay connected to the 
world while at the same time being capable of forming new objectivities – new options 
for how they can think about the world. In terms of semiotics people are subjects who 
can conceive of how their own subjectivities and the subjectivities of others can differ. 
In this way semiotics, doctrina signorum, allows for a theory of how people can develop 
and change their own thinking and, crucially for this paper, how they can develop 
and change the thinking of others. 
                                                                                                                                           
by themselves.... I say if we consider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning and 
import of the attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, we shall clearly perceive that 
they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, "who works all in all," and "by whom all things consist." (ibid.) 
“147. Hence, it is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit 
whatsoever distinct from ourselves.” (ibid.) 
7 “...for since it is now known to me that, properly speaking, we perceive bodies only by the 
understanding which is in us, and not by the imagination, or the senses, and that we do not perceive 
them through seeing them or touching them, but only because we perceive them in thought, I know that 
there is nothing more easy for me to know than my own mind.” René Descartes and F. E. Sutcliffe, 
Discourse on method ; and the Meditations, Harmondsworth, England, Penguin Books, 1968, p. 112. 
8 ...particularly Deely, Four ages of understanding : the first postmodern survey of philosophy from ancient times to the 
turn of the twenty-first century, p. 127. 
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PHILOSOPHY VERSUS THE SOPHISTS 
There has been a tradition of contestation between sophists and philosophers at least 
since Plato’s dialogues criticised sophists and their well known product – rhetoric. 
This paper joins that contention on the side of the sophists. Plato’s, and by extension 
much philosophy, for instance Descartes’, Berkeley’s, Hume’s and Kant’s is about 
advocating consolidated ways to think. In terms of the concepts described in the first 
part of this paper much philosophy is about inventing interlocking semiotic schema by 
which the subject should view the world so that particular types of society, for instance 
particular types of democracies, might come about. The priority of the sophist on the 
other hand is to investigate the inventions and the interlocking of discourse itself, not 
what sort of society the discourse might create. That is, the sophist is primarily 
interested in intellectual initiatives irrespective of their content. The intention of a 
particular philosophy is a secondary priority. Concern about purpose comes after the 
imperative to understand individual and communal thinking processes as such. This is 
one of the reasons why sophistry and rhetoric are attacked. The charge is that they 
are amoral and to do with the contingent and the fragmentary. They are to do with 
the operation of thought as such rather than to do with how this or that schema of 
thought might deliver this or that perspective on the world. As we will see in Plato’s 
words below sophists are accused of lacking moral purpose. Rhetorics may borrow 
from the ideas of systematic philosophy to align with the views of ‘right thinking 
people’ for particular projects. For instance contemporary norms of morality might be 
enlisted in order to succeed in a court case, or to gain support in a public speech, to 
seek agreement with an opinion editorial, or to align with presumed constituents’ 
views in a lobbying letter. But rhetoric is never wedded to any fixed way of thinking. 
The next day the same case may be made using entirely different premises and logic, 
or indeed the same premises and logic may to used to make quite another argument. 
We currently live in an era where there is a huge industry dedicated to sophism and 
the proliferation of public rhetoric. By sophism we mean the impartial and amoral 
analysis and production of contemporary discourses, theologies, mores and 
sentiments. These are the inflections of understanding which guide how the world is 
generally conceived. They are understandings which help to maintains political and 
economic form. Sophistic research helps a client understand how and why people 
think what they think. This intelligence is then used as to guide the most effective 
public affairs and marketing interventions into the thinking of groups identified as 
important to the client. Interventions by large commercial, or by government interests 
are often on a scale and to a depth too significant to be referred to as mere 
‘persuasion’. Such interventions can affect the very nature of social systems. This 
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paper suggests that we can better understand this activity as a sophistic processes 
rather than as a clash of philosophies.  
THE MORPHING OF CLASSICAL SUBJECTIVITY 
For the reasons outlined in the abstract this paper draws from the writings of mid 20th 
century classicist Werner Jaeger (1888-1961) whose landmark Paideia was subtitled in 
German: Die Formung des griechiscen Menschen9
The history of paideia considered as the genetic morphology of the ideal 
relations between the individual and the polis, is the indispensible philosophical 
background for the understanding of Plato.
 – the formation of the Greek peoples. As 
we will see Jaeger discusses sophistry and rhetoric, but a large part of this three 
volume book is about how aesthetic expression, principally poetry and drama, was 
used to convey and by implication still conveys, the mores, the discourse … what used 
to be called ‘the logos’ … which facilitates mental conceiving. Jaeger does not discuss 
the notion of semiotics. None of: ‘Peirce’; ‘signs’; or ‘semiotics’ are indexed in the 
1,325 pages. However the potential for applying such a theoretical overlay is clear. For 
Deely, Poinsot or Peirce ‘actuality’ can only ever be signified, that is inducted into 
mental conceiving, via the signs of that actuality… via the objectification of what it is 
that is encountered. Jaeger’s work spreads before the reader a panoply of the ways the 
Ancient Greek world conceptualised itself, that is reflected itself back to itself, i.e. 
objectified itself, by means of cultural production. He goes deeply into the ways the 
world was represented through media which helped generations of archaic and 
classical Greeks, particularly the Athenians to apprehend, to mentally absorb, to 
position themselves in different ways vis-a-vis the cosmos during epochs of radical 
transformation. In this sense Jaeger’s book can be ‘read’ semiotically as about the 
‘morphology’ of the then contemporary types of subjectivity: 
10
In terms of morphology it is perhaps disappointing that Paideia’s sub title was 
given the English translation: The ideals of Greek Culture. Surely Die Formung des griechiscen 
Menschen is far closer to what the book is about? The German better suits the idea of a 
changing subjectivity – the creation of different types of people. Jaeger himself seems 
to hint at an uneasiness with this translation when he feels it necessary to tell us in his 
own words that this translation was: “…because of the difficulty of rendering the 
original title literally
  
11
                                                     
9 Werner Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek paideia, London, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 140. 
.” The compromise was perhaps to do with Jaeger’s main 
10 Werner Jaeger, Paideia : the ideals of Greek culture [Paideia : die formung des griechischen Menschen], Vol. II, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1944a, p. 84. 
11 Op.cit, pp. 140-141. 
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concern with the more outer cultural and educational manifestations of the historical 
drama which he was describing. He was not as concerned with the inner workings of 
the mind as with how classical cultural media were used educationally to strive for the 
creation of the most perfect forms of human being – beings with the best possible 
understandings of their own nature and their world. The ultimate form of this cultural 
education – more available to the aristocracy and upper classes – was referred to as 
‘paideia’. Paideia exploited the rich signa of the best poetry, literature, satire and 
drama. The finest of these creative arts provided the signs and metaphors, the codes 
and modes of internal and external conceptualisation which led to a civilisation, albeit 
a patriarchal, slave owning civilisation, which was full of intellectual brilliance. This 
cultural equipment, these mind-enabling discursive modes differed in different eras. 
People were limited or enabled to conceive of, and thus operate in their 
contemporary worlds, in different ways depending on the culture-borne conceiving – 
the subjectivity creating mechanisms which were available to them. In this sense 
people were ‘formed’ as historical varieties of archaic and ancient Greeks just as types 
of discursive resources have enabled the formation of other varieties of people since. 
The discursively formed peoples of different cultures and eras have different slants on 
knowledge; ideology; taste; opinion; ontology; critique; common sense and so on. For 
instance in ancient Greece – slave owning and patriarchy tended to be common 
sense! This variability of sensibility, this variability of mental possibilities – variability 
of the tendencies of perception in the perceiving subject – implies a world which 
metamorphoses from the point of view of subjectivity. Process philosophy might be 
more sympathetic to this notion. For instance the occasional ‘abduction12
                                                     
12 Peirce’s notion of ‘abduction’ might be termed ‘epiphany’ or sudden direct realisation of the reality or 
actuality of something.  Abduction can be explained like this: Already subjectively held signs which are 
unconsciously or semiconsciously aligned or ‘networked’ together in significantly massive ways are 
suddenly brought into clear or clearer consciousness by a small sign trigger. That is: A slight external 
stimulus or a wandering internal thought suddenly fits together as the final piece of an elaborate mental 
jigsaw. The new sign completes, or brings into being or significantly modifies, a relatively large, whole 
new network, or sub-network of semiotic relationships.  This major semiotic episode manifests as an out 
of the ordinary acquisition of surely felt understanding. A new line of thought quickly emerges which 
seems to correspond with or solve a string of other thoughts or puzzles. This is an ‘Ah Ha’ – I’ve got it!’ 
moment.    
’ aside, a 
metamorphosing sensibility fits a semiotic approach to how the mind functions in a 
pragmatic, incremental and adaptive, semiotic manner. But signs of the same 
actuality can change. It is the role of rhetoric to understand and bring changed 
signification to bear. A non-process philosophy: – we have mentioned Plato, 
Descartes, Berkeley, Hume and Kant’s – which insists on a more constant reality, 
perhaps one ordained by God, would find it difficult to deal with the sort of Formung 
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des Menschen described by Jaeger. It would imply the marooning of thinkers on archaic 
conceptual islands where paradigms of thought, for instance certain notions of the 
environment or politics or justice could never change in any fundamental way. This is 
because, irrespective of new ‘facts’, irrespective of logical argument, how these issues 
could be conceptualised would be locked into the ways of thinking – the notionally 
‘fixed’ semiotic possibilities available to a particular presumed historic and cultural 
way of being. It is only when one accepts the plasticity of human conceiving 
mechanisms – that is the ability to see the same ‘facts’ in different ways that a mature 
conceptualisation of how the world is really apprehended is achieved. This 
metamorphosis of conceiving mechanisms, and consequently metamorphosis of how 
the world appears from the subjective point of view is allowed for in semiotics. 
Peirce’s semiotics includes a limit notion of pragmatism. For Peirce mental signs of 
the world can be legitimately invented and rearranged within the limitation that the 
pragmatic outcomes of different ways of thinking can ultimately be validated in some 
empirical manner13
SOPHISTRY AND RHETORIC  
. So for Peirce the semiotic morphing of the subject would not run 
out of control into a never ending relativism. 
The plasticity of ways of conceiving of the world – the variation of the way ‘facts’ can 
be apprehended as correct – was originally the domain of the ‘sophist’ as properly 
designated. Sophists’ mode of operation was and is skilful intervention into the realm 
of signa – the realm of cultural conceiving mechanisms. The early, multi-disciplinary 
sophists of the Greek Enlightenment invented all sorts of revolutionary ways of 
conceiving ‘facts’ which had previously had their meanings locked into, that is only 
available via, always slanted in their meaning by – archaic conceiving systems, i.e. 
                                                     
13 Charles S. Peirce, Paul Weiss and Charles Hartshorne, Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1974. For instance think of some ultimate empirical 
consequences of learning to fly, or celebrating a birthday, or of reading this article. Vast networks of 
semiotically produced thoughts to do with flying would ultimately have to correspond to numerous 
empirical facts, such as the empirical fact that if one lands a plane correctly it settles on the runway 
smoothly; if one yanks the stick back with the engine turned off at 10 feet one is likely to crash tail first. 
Semiosis to do with birthday celebrations might for instance be validated with reference to pleasant 
feelings among party guests; or perhaps to a cessation of birthdays after the normal number. Semiosis to 
do with reading this article may result in the alignment or the diversity of remarks from those who have 
read it. All of the latter, and hundreds more potential empirical entities or processes are things in the real 
world in terms of which the relevance, the utility, the connection however indirect to a quality of 
actuality of the signs of the semiotic process can be validated or realised, i.e. understood as real and thus 
constituent of a valid realist philosophy. Anyone with an idealist critique of this reasoning is invited to 
take up flying. 
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archaic logos. The sophists built new philosophical, new scientific, new theological, 
new grammatical and other methods of conceiving and expressing conceptions14. This 
development challenged the relationships of people to: ‘the gods’, to fate, to justice, to 
courage and so on15. New discourse, new ways to achieve and share mental possibility 
modified or overturned previous ways of apprehending the world. In particular the 
sophists’ codification of grammar, dialectic and rhetoric provided advanced ways that 
society could talk to itself and reach communal decisions16. Grammar in particular is 
analogous to HTML code on today’s Internet. This codification – this 
standardization, i.e. the promulgation and acceptance of the rules of speaking and 
writing – meant people divided by geography and time could now take part in a 
massive system of uniform creation and distribution of accurate information. The 
‘trivium’ of grammar, dialectic and rhetoric, as the medieval Latins called it, provided 
a massive boost to the ways people could learn and form themselves, that is develop 
their subjectivities. The trivium was the backbone of education for millennia. Even 
‘rhetoric’ as developed by the Romans and scholastics is still widely studied in US 
universities. Publications of the 1,700 member Rhetoric Society of America17
                                                     
14 In a footnote to the introduction of the collected works of rhetorician Isocrates (436–338BCE), George 
Norlin writes: “The term sophist had not until later times any invidious associations. It was applied 
indiscriminately to all professors of the new learning–lecturers on literature, science, philosophy, and 
particularly oratory, for which there was great demand in the democratic states.”: (Isocrates, George 
Norlin and Larue Van Hook, Isocrates, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966, p. xii.)  
 
demonstrate rhetoric’s relevance to the 21st Century. Both now and then rhetoric as 
properly understood involves[d] conceiving the processes of people’s mental 
conception. It is about theorising and if possible empirically exploring the nuances of 
the zeitgeist, the intricacies of the media of particular audiences’ minds – i.e. how they 
think. This is theorising which can of course be approached via a semiotic conceptual 
schema. The goal, now as then, has always been to blend with and skillfully penetrate 
pertinent discourses or ‘logos’ while avoiding the dissonance of straying too far from 
the target groups’ norms, their perceived ‘right ways of thinking’. Now as then the 
15 Werner Jaeger, Paideia : the ideals of Greek culture [Paideia : die formung des griechischen Menschen], Vol. I, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1944b. 
16 “Before them, [the Elder Sophists] we never hear of grammar, rhetoric and dialectic. They must 
therefore have invented them. The new techne is clearly the systematic expression of the principle of 
shaping the intellect, because it begins by instruction in the form of thought. This educational technique 
is one of the greatest discoveries which the mind of man has ever made: it was not until it explored these 
three of its activities that the mind apprehended the hidden law of its own structure.” Op.cit, Paideia, 
(Vol.I:p.314)  
17 See the 1,700 member Rhetoric Society of America web site for links to Rhetoric Society Quarterly and 
thousands of current studies and writings on the subject of rhetoric. 
http://associationdatabase.com/aws/RSA/pt/sp/rsq  
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most effective way of influencing perceptions is to join in the existing discussion in an 
empathetic manner with the intent of steering ideas gently. The ethics of this activity 
will be remarked upon in the conclusion to this paper.  
CLASSICAL CONTEST FOR IDEAS 
Jaeger’s work on how classical Greek culture created and steered thought starts with 
poetry. He contrasts the poetry of Homer, Hesiod, Solon, Aeschylus, Euripides, 
Thucydides, Aristophanes and others. Jaeger emphasises the way poetry changes 
between the archaic and the Greek Enlightenment period. For instance in the Iliad of 
early Homer the human predicament is depicted as helplessly subject to fierce, unjust 
all powerful gods18
[Solon] held that justice was the divine principle immanent in human life, and 
that if it were transgressed it would avenge itself inevitably…As soon as men 
recognise this connection between crime and punishment they take on 
themselves a great part of the responsibility for their own misery.
. Later poets see humans as rational actors who bear more 
responsibility for their own circumstances. Solon (c. 638-558BCE) was one of the first 
poets to start this change towards rationality: 
19
In the fifth and fourth centuries BCE poetry was fundamental to communal self-
understanding in an increasingly rationalising Athens. The great poets both charted 
the waves of self aware moral and political attitudes and sometimes did their best to 
influence them. Jaeger explains how author of Pericles’ funeral oration, the poet 
Thucydides (c.460-395BCE) had a profound sense of how the intellectual culture of 
Athens was setting the logos of the future of the world: 
 
The remarkable composite character which marks all the expressions of the 
Athenian spirit: literary, artistic, philosophical and moral reappears in Pericles’ 
conception of the state… [Thucydides] therefore makes Pericles describe it as 
the interaction of delicately balanced opposites: self support and enjoyment of 
the world’s products; labour and recreation; business and holiday; spirit and 
ethos; thought and energy… Thucydides’ creative insight first recognised the 
fact that Attic culture was to have a far reaching historical influence… The 
                                                     
18“Sing, O goddess, the anger of Achilles son of Peleus, that brought countless ills upon the Achaeans. 
Many a brave soul did it send hurrying down to Hades, and many a hero did it yield a prey to dogs and 
vultures, for so were the counsels of Jove fulfilled from the day on which the son of Atreus, king of men, 
and great Achilles, first fell out with one another. And which of the gods was it that set them on to 
quarrel? It was the son of Jove and Leto; for he was angry with the king and sent a pestilence upon the 
host to plague the people, because the son of Atreus had dishonoured Chryses his priest.” Homer and 
Samuel Butler, The Iliad of Homer and the Odyssey, Chicago, Encyclopædia Britannica, 1952. 
19 Op.cit, Paideia (Vol.I:p.256)  
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Greek ideal of culture…was charged with the utmost possible historical life and 
meaning.20
Not long after this rosy depiction, as Athens declined under the weight of military 
defeats and political intrigue another great poet painted a different view of Athens: 
  
 …the public had never been compelled to pay such earnest attention to its 
spiritual problems as now; its political implications had never been realised so 
vividly as when Aristophanes [c.448-380BCE] stressed them by his lament for 
the disappearance of classical tragedy. At this critical juncture, the greatest of all 
comic poets once more emphasised the intimate connection between the spirit 
and the future of the state, and the vast responsibility of creative genius to the 
community…21
Jaeger’s discussion of these poets conveys the evolution of discourses or logos. He 
explains the changes in these fundamental cultural conceiving mechanisms – these 
works of art which carried the ways people were able to think of themselves – to 
‘objectify’ themselves and to objectify their societies in different eras and different 
circumstances. Poetry in this sense was eventually superseded by even more 
discursively potent prose speech and writing
 
22. Prose became increasingly 
predominant as the fifth and particularly the fourth century BCE progressed. The 
development of prose and the more advanced discourse or logos which it enabled is 
linked to the sensational emergence of the wide-scale teaching of rhetoric and 
philosophy, particularly Socratic-Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. Philosophy 
and rhetoric both enabled the fourth century to take revolutionary steps forward in 
the intricacy of the modes of thought by which people could now conceive of 
themselves and their world. But there is an important difference between these two 
prose-borne media of the intellect. The difference is illustrated by Jaeger’s explanation 
of the motives behind Plato’s attempts to suppress what Plato saw as some of the 
anarchic potential of both poetry and rhetoric. Plato was constantly afraid of Athens 
slipping back into too hyper-democratic a political form. His dialogues, particularly 
the Republic advocated a certain approach to conceiving man’s nature and position in 
the cosmos via an ‘Idea of Good’23
                                                     
20 Op.cit, Paideia (Vol.I:pp.410-411) 
 – a higher realisation of human purpose. This 
higher realisation was achieved by thinking and behaving in what we might call 
righteous or pious moral ways. Jaeger points out that in Laws, Plato changes ‘Idea of 
Good’ to understanding of and respect for a notion of ‘God’:  
21 Op.cit, Paideia (Vol.I:p.381) 
22 Op.cit Paideia (Vol.I:p.346) 
23 Plato, Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, The collected dialogues of Plato, including the letters, New 
York, Princeton University Press, 2005. Republic. (VII: 7.534b, p. 766) 
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Athenian: My friends – this is what I would say to them – God, who as the old 
saw [proverbial saying] has it, holds in his hands beginning, end, and middle of 
all that is, moves through the cycle of nature straight to his end, and ever at his 
side walks right, the justicer [judge] of them that forsake God’s law. He that 
would be happy follows close in her train. With lowly and chastised mien 
[bearing], but whoso is lifted up with vanity- with pride or riches or rank or 
foolish conceit of youthful comeliness and all on fire within with wantonness, as 
one that needs neither governor nor guide, but is fitted  rather to be himself a 
guide to others – such a one is left alone, forsaken of God. In his abandonment 
he takes to others like himself and works general confusion by his frantic 
career.24
Here is the Platonism on which Christianity was built. Like Christianity, clearly in 
original Platonism there is a need for a discourse of supplication. There is a need for a 
Platonic semiotics, a narrative involving God and how to behave with regard to God. 
Plato devises an original logos – a new mode of thinking which is necessary in order to 
Formung des Menschen in a way which would precipitate or at least work towards the 
creation of a utopian Republic. But Plato was concerned that competing logos of 
archaic theology in the discourse of still powerfully affecting ancient poetry would 
threatened this project. The notion of humans as powerless before irrational, angry 
gods for instance did not fit with encouragement for individuals to supplicate 
themselves to achieve personal spiritual benefits and a wider communal good. Worse 
still were the critical, discursive effects of some of the teachers of rhetoric. These 
maestros of agonistic were more interested in deconstructing discourse, in pointing 
out the failings of rival arguments and using suitable fragments for their own 
arguments for contingent and mundane purposes. Rhetoricians were not in the 
business of constructing a particular discourse which might achieve the perfect man 
and a utopian society. Their work was and is the deployment of discursive tactics 
which sway minds in the short term for expedient ends. Leading rhetorician Gorgias 
for instance appears to have achieved celebrity and wealth by displaying his 
unmatched ability to perform oratory as a form of spectacular entertainment
 
25
Socrates: Then poetry is a kind of public address? 
. In 
Plato’s Gorgias in a manner reminiscent of the modern concept ‘moral panic’ Plato 
attacks both poetic and rhetorical activity which might interfere with the ‘responsible’ 
narratives of his own philosophy: 
Callicles: Evidently. 
                                                     
24 Op.cit Laws (IV: 716a, p.1307) 
25 Op.cit Paideia (Vol.I:p.347 and Vol.III, p.142) 
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Socrates: Must it not be a rhetorical public address? Do you not consider that 
the poets engage in rhetoric in the theatres? 
Callicles: I do. 
Socrates: Then we have now discovered a form of rhetoric addressed to a 
people composed alike of children and women and men, slaves and free – a 
form which we cannot much admire, for we describe it as a form of flattery.  
Callicles: Certainly 
Socrates: Well, but what of the rhetoric addressed to the Athenian people and 
other free people in various cities – what does that mean to us? Do the orators 
seem to you always to speak with an eye to what is best, their sole aim being to 
render the citizens as perfect as possible by their speeches, or is their impulse 
also to gratify the citizens and do they neglect the common good for their 
personal interest and treat the people like children attempting only to please 
them, with no concern whatever whether such conduct makes them better or 
worse?26
Plato does not seek to end all poetry. Instead he wants to edit or censor poetry 
which carries discourse, that is semiotic systems, which were opposed or obstructive to 
his project and to co-opt poetry where it might be advantageous. This is because of 
what he acknowledges as poetry’s power to influence subjectivity. He says poetry 
would be of better service if it carried the discourses which he is advocating:  
 
 …[Plato] never suggests for a moment that poetry ought to be abolished 
altogether as an educational force and replaced by the abstract knowledge 
which is philosophy. On the contrary the bitter energy behind his criticisms 
arises ultimately from his knowledge that nothing can replace the formative 
power of the masterpieces of music and poetry…[but]…half [philosophy’s] 
educational task remained unfulfilled until the new truth puts on the vesture of a 
new poetry, like a soul which gives form to a new body.27
In a similar vein, for all Plato’s lampooning of rhetoricians in Gorgias and Sophist, he 
can see how rhetoric might be used to advocate his views – to further his discourse. In 
Phaedrus Plato has Socrates acknowledge the work of contemporary great rhetorician 
Isocrates (436–338 BCE): 
  
Socrates: It seems to me that his [Isocrates’] natural powers give him a 
superiority over anything that Lysias [another rhetorician] has achieved in 
literature, and also that in point of character he is of a nobler composition; 
hence it would not surprise me if with advancing years he made all his literary 
                                                     
26 Plato, Hamilton and Cairns, The collected dialogues of Plato, including the letters, p. 284. (Gorgias, 502c-e) 
27 Jaeger, Paideia : the ideals of Greek culture [Paideia : die formung des griechischen Menschen], Vol.II, p. 222. 
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predecessors look like very small fry…For that mind of his, Phaedrus, contains 
an innate tincture of philosophy.28
Jaeger suggests Phaedrus was a later work of Plato’s and that Plato is here 
commenting on his peer intellectual rival’s mature work and that ‘early promise’ is 
used in an ironic and begrudging mood.
 
29 Jaeger also points out the compliment 
which Plato pays Isocrates in passages of Laws. There the philosopher uses some of 
the rhetorician’s previously published passages30. Isocrates’ secular, but ethical and 
educationally oriented rhetoric founded the great rhetorical and educational tradition 
of two millennia which included Cicero (106-43 BCE) and Quintilian (35-100 CE). As 
a further endorsement by original philosophers of the importance of rhetoric, Jaeger 
quotes a tradition that Aristotle (384-322 BCE) announced his own new course in 
rhetoric while he was still at Plato’s academy with the line: “Twere shame to hold our 
peace, and let Isocrates speak.”31 Aristotle’s handbook on rhetoric is still cited by 
modern textbooks on public persuasion. See for instance the chapter: “How 
persuasion works: What Aristotle taught,” in Thomson (1998).32
CONCLUSION AND ETHICAL CRITIQUE  
 Consequently, 
whatever the truth of the ancient quotation, rhetoric certainly gained the imprimatur 
of a legitimate subject of study in the school which founded western philosophy.   
The contention of this paper is that when considering initiatives to analyse and 
influence social and political form it is useful to compare classical and 21st century 
rhetorical activity. A more comprehensive study would need to explain how the more 
complex modern activities of public affairs are indeed rhetorical in the same or similar 
sense to rhetorical activities of the classical period. This however must wait for 
another paper. For some commentators public relations, lobbying, advertising, 
opinion research and so on are an inevitable aspect of modernity which should be 
taken at face value as part of the way society is organised. These commentators would 
have modern rhetoric professionalised so that it conformed to ethical codes. For 
others these activities harbor sophistic [in the ‘evil’ sense] Svengalies who seek to 
                                                     
28 Op.cit (Phaedrus, 279a) ; In Isocrates (p.xvi) Norlin writes: “Isocrates took from Gorgias a style which 
was extremely artificial and made it artistic. In so doing, he fixed the style of rhetorical prose for the 
Greek world, and through the influence of Cicero, for modern times as well.” 
29 Werner Jaeger, Paideia : the ideals of Greek culture [Paideia : die formung des griechischen Menschen], Vol. III, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 1944c, p. 184. 
30 Op. Cit. p.344  
31 Op. Cit. p.147 [There are different interpretations of Diogenes Laertius on this quote.] 
32 Peter Thompson, Persuading Aristotle : the timeless art of persuasion in business, negotiation and the media, St 
Leonards, N.S.W., Allen & Unwin, 1998. 
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influencing perception merely in order to extend their self interests. Optimists view 
‘professionally accredited’ insinuation of specific semiotic conceiving mechanisms, 
specific forms of thinking into particular targeted audiences’ minds, as not necessarily 
a bad thing. Such projects can be seen as in line with Plato’s view that the widescale 
insinuation of certain forms of thought into individuals was essential in order to 
achieve the best kind of society. The sophists’ rejoinder – as explained by Jaeger when 
explicating Isocrates – is that preaching beneficial forms of thought is all very well. 
However what is more important is the realisation of a wider self consciousness of 
how people think – of what ‘forms of thought’ per se actually are. The sophists and 
their rhetoric were primarily concerned with how forms of thought are inculcated. 
They were analysts, theorists and production workers in the industry of subjectivity 
creation. The conception of the world which their rhetoric conveyed, e.g.: a particular 
aesthetic; God fearing; socialism; or conservatism; was secondary. Consequently 
higher education in this field should be pitched at showing how to temporarily stand 
outside of particular philosophies. The initial priority should be to understand how 
one’s own and society conceiving mechanism’s might be inculcated with any views. 
Attainment of this sophistic realisation is the best defence against the misuse of 
rhetoric. Something like this sophistic awareness seems to have been attempted with 
the 1970s to 1990s, originally left-wing inspired emergence of critical and cultural 
studies. But the initiative was lost amid a welter of complicated and contested 
theorisation for theorisation’s sake. The loss came at a time when universities became 
more like businesses. Industry representatives increasingly dominated their governing 
bodies to draw up instrumental and financially driven mission statements. A new 
breed of ‘academic managers’ – as opposed to ‘senior academics’ – took their cue 
from strategic priorities which emasculated anything which smacked of philosophical 
debate. Controversy was contained by the device of having, responsible-sounding 
‘cultural theory’ components in largely instrumental media studies, literary studies, 
public relations and similar courses. Cultural theory units of study usually give an 
equal hearing to all sorts of theories, including the impossible to understand and the 
plainly nonsensical. Theories must be ‘learned’ rather than used as incendiaries to 
spark debate. Semiotics is one of the approaches which has been emasculated in this 
process. Critical and cultural theory taught via this non-controversial orthodoxy 
becomes a fig leaf pasted over what might otherwise be systematic and potent 
critique. This diffusion avoids challenges to the current instrumental raison d’être of 
higher education. Potentially potent sophistic and philosophical debate has been 
bequeathed to the few stalwart, committed educationalists whose career prospects do 
not look so good.  
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The response of this paper to the above pessimistic picture is multi-fold. Firstly 
semiotics, particularly as it is as explained by Deely and his colleagues, needs to be 
rescued from the theoreticist mire in which it has become stuck. Next another 
dimension needs to be added to what we might call the two-dimensional way that 
philosophy is generally handled in universities. By this I mean that it is not enough to 
simply find, explicate and advocate the right ideas. Instead, like Plato did 
begrudgingly in relations to poetry, and as both Plato and Aristotle did in relation to 
rhetoric, the philosopher needs to understand how ideas are inculcated into minds. 
An amalgam of these two requirements leads to the third response. This is the appeal 
for recognition that a combination of the proper understandings of both rhetoric and 
semiotics enables a powerful theory of the creation of subjectivity to be developed. 
This paper only scratches the surface. For instance the more recent responses of neo-
pragmatists needs to be dealt with in this theory building. But that again is a project 
for a later paper. The main point which is being advanced in the present paper is that 
currently there is an appalling deficit in academic approaches to understanding 
today’s public affairs communications. There is a need for a far more sophisticated 
understanding of the objectifying and subjectivity creating processes and effects of 
public relations, lobbying, advertising and so on. This deficit involves a failure to 
recognise that just like in Plato’s time these media are (1) fundamental to how complex 
society, particularly complex democracy operates and (2) an understanding of rhetoric 
offers potential benefits to progressive philosophical projects. It goes without saying 
that (3) rhetoric can also be toxic to subjectivity. The latter is the default position of 
incurious academics and public opinion generally. This brings us to the point about 
contemporary rhetorical activity and ethics. The definition of public relations which I 
like to advocate is: persuasive activity which deliberately sets out to affect people’s 
views within the bounds of community standards. A discussion of the notion 
‘community standards’ in this formula would clearly be the province of philosophy per 
se. And there would of course be a whole other paper to do with the philosophies 
which current public affairs practices convey, avoid, distort or oppose. The point 
being made in this paper however is, as Plato conceded with regard to poetry, that 
whatever moral codes; whatever reasoning; whatever inspiration is contained in a 
particular philosophy, putting these notions across, that is, getting people to adopt 
notions is at least as important as creating and explaining them. Consequently the 
fecund and challenging field of research which this conclusion suggests is that a far 
more ‘sophisticated’ – in its original sense – approach to public affairs media needs to 
be taken than the presently generally dismissive, even haughty approach in some 
quarters. The contemporary rhetorical industries produce products which are in some 
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ways like fissile material. They can do immense damage. But it is because of the 
potential for damage as well as the potential for usefulness that this potent materials 
need to be exhaustively examined and intelligently understood.  
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